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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2000) as an appeal from a final order
resulting from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following are the issues presented for review:
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the presiding
officer's findings that the Appellant assisted in marketing unauthorized insurance in
violation o( the Utah Insurance Code and the Insurance Commissioner's Cease and
Desist Order?
Standard o( Review: Whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to
support the finding below that the Appellant was marketing unauthorized insurance
in violation o( the Cease and Desist Order is a question of fact and is reviewed
under the substantial evidence test. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997); First
Natl. Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990);
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah App.
1992).
2. Whether the presiding officer erred by placing the burden of proof on the
Insurance Department to establish that the Appellant violated the Utah Insurance
Code and the Insurance Commissioner's Order?
Standard of Review: Whether the presiding officer correctly placed the
burden of proof is a question of law, reviewed for correctness without deference to
1

the presiding officer. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997); Morton IntT. Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n,, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(55). (63), (68) & (125) (Supp. 2002)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-4-106 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-15-102 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-405 (2001)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE:
This matter is a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals from an

Order of the Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department (the
"Commissioner") revoking the license of the Appellant, Gerald G. Ide ("Mr. Ide")
for marketing unauthorized insurance in violation of the Utah Insurance Code and of
an order of the Commissioner.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
On December 6. 200 K the Commissioner issued a Cease and Desist Order

against Mr. Ide and others, ordering them to immediately cease marketing
unauthorized insurance in the State of Utah and to "immediately cease and desist
any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State
of Utah, including soliciting, marketing, or proposing to make an insurance contract
. . . publishing or disseminating any advertisement or information for insurance, for
any unauthorized insurer." (R. at 133).

Mr. Ide, in concert with others named in the Cease and Desist Order, violated
that order by marketing a second unauthorized insurance product in Utah, and the
Commissioner issued an Emergency Order under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-20
(1997) on February 6, 2002. immediately suspending Mr. Ide's insurance agent's
license. (R. at 1). On the same date, the Utah Insurance Department (the
""Department") initiated a formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-20(3) (1997) for the revocation of Mr.
Ide's insurance agent's license. (R. at 6).
A formal hearing was held on April 24, 2002, before the presiding officer
designated by the Commissioner. The presiding officer issued an Order on Hearing
on April 30, 2002, revoking the Appellant's insurance agent's license. (R. at 102).
Mr. Ide filed a Petition for Agency Review on May 29, 2002. (R. at 297).
Following the submission o( Memoranda by the parties, the Commissioner issued an
Order on Review dated October 31, 2002. (R. at 382).
Mr. Ide then filed his Petition for Review before the Utah Court of Appeals
on November 22, 2002. (R. at 391).
C.

DISPOSITION BELOW:
The Insurance Commissioner issued a final order dated October 31, 2002,

affirming the presiding officer's decision revoking Mr. Ide's insurance agent's
license for violating the Utah Insurance Code and the Commissioner's Cease and
Desist Order by assisting in the marketing of unauthorized insurance.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June 2001, Mr. Ide, in concert with others, marketed an unauthorized
health insurance product known as Employers Mutual to residents of the State of
Utah in violation of the Utah Insurance Code (State's Exhibit 1, R. at 128-134),
incorrectly claiming that it was exempt from state regulation under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") (State's Exhibit 1, R. at 132).
On or about October 17, 2001, at the request of department personnel, Mr. Ide came
into the Department offices to discuss his activities in relation to Employers Mutual
(R. at 420). Department personnel informed Mr. Ide that Employers Mutual was

\

unauthorized insurance. (R. at 421).
The Commissioner issued a Cease and Desist Order on December 6. 2001,
i

naming Mr. Ide and 26 other individuals and organizations, and ordered those
licensed as agents in the State of Utah to
immediately Cease and Desist any assistance to any person doing an
unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah, including soliciting,
marketing, or proposing to make an insurance contract, taking receiving or
forwarding an application for insurance, collecting or receiving, in full or in
part, any insurance premium, issuing or delivering an insurance policy or
other evidence of an insurance contract, publishing or disseminating any
advertisement or information for insurance, for any unauthorized insurer.
(State's Exhibit 1, R. at 133, emphasis added). Mr. Ide raised no challenge to the
findings contained in the Cease and Desist Order, nor did he challenge the
restrictions it placed on his marketing efforts.
Later that same month (December 2001), Mr. Ide received information
regarding a product known as "Privilege Care" and began to market Privilege Care
4

to Utah residents. (R. at 525; Br. of Appellant at 4). Mr. Ide received the
information regarding Privilege Care from Don R. (Donald) Smith and Five Star
Marketing, who were also named in the December 6, 2001, Cease and Desist Order.
(R. at 423, 425). Privilege Care falsely claimed to be underwritten by Union Labor
Life. (R. at 425).
Mr. Ide preformed no due diligence to determine whether Privilege Care was
authorized insurance prior to marketing it; his only inquiry was to ask its promoters
about its legitimacy. (R. at 551-52, 555).
On January 24. 2002, two employees of the Department met with Mr. Ide in
his office as a follow-up to the Employers Mutual matter. (R. at 424-25). During
that visit, Mr. Ide showed the department employees some information regarding
Privilege Care (State's Exhibit 3, R. at 136-50) that he had received from Donald
Smith of Five Star Marketing. (R. at 425). The two Department employees
informed him that Union Labor Life did not underwrite Privilege Care and that
Privilege Care was an unauthorized insurance product. (R. at 425). Mr. Ide
represented to those Department employees that he had told Donald Smith that he
would not market Privilege Care until the Department approved it. (R. at 426, 440,
465).
Contrary to that representation, at the time of this meeting with Department
employees, Mr. Ide had already marketed Privilege Care to two individuals. (R. at
558). Further. Mr. Ide told the Department employees that he would not market
Privilege Care until he was informed that the Department had approved it. (R. at
5

426, 440, 445 & 529). Despite his statement, and knowing that Privilege Care was
being promoted by some of the very same persons and entities named in the Cease
and Desist Order. Mr. Ide marketed Privilege Care the very next day. (R at 429,
452-454 & 530). He also continued to market Privilege Care by offering it to
another agent for his client. (R. at 409-412). Mr. Ide undertook to assist in
marketing this unauthorized insurance product even though he was an experienced
insurance agent, having been licensed as a resident insurance agent in the State of
Utah since 1976, and licensed in the States of Utah. Idaho. Wyoming and Nevada.
(R. at 517). Mr. Ide also spent 99% of his efforts in marketing health insurance and
was a regional manager responsible for about 28 agents. (R. at 518). Mr. Ide also
was familiar with the Department's concern with unauthorized insurance and had
read the Department Bulletins on the subject. (R. at 566; State's Exhibit 10, R. at
208-23).
Because Mr. Ide ignored the warnings of Department personnel, violated his
word to them, violated the Cease and Desist Order, and violated the Utah Insurance
Code by marketing Privilege Care to Utah residents, the Commissioner issued an
Emergency Order on February 6, 2002, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-20 (1997),
immediately suspending Mr. Ide's insurance agent's license. (R. at 1-5). On the
same date, the Department initiated a Formal Proceeding under Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-20(3) (1997). seeking to revoke Mr. Ide's insurance agent's license. (R. at
6-10).

6

At the formal hearing, the Department presented the testimony of two of the
persons to whom Mr. Ide had marketed Privilege Care. The first, Mrs. Karen
Wilbert, contacted Mr. Ide seeking health insurance that would cover gastric bypass
surgery (R. at 478). Mr. Ide told her he had an insurance product that would do that.
(R. at 479. 533). Mr. Ide went to her home and completed an application for Ms.
Wilbert. (R. at 481-482, 526-27 and State's Exhibit 5, R. at 153). Mr. Ide also took
a check from her for the first month's premium. (R. at 482, 535 and State's Exhibit
5. R. at 154).
The second, Mr. Kirk Miller, had previously purchased the unauthorized
insurance product. Employers Mutual, from Mr. Ide. (R. at 451). The day after Mr.
Ide met with Department Employees who informed him that Privilege Care was also
unauthorized insurance, Mr. Ide again met with Mr. Miller to switch him from the
Employers Mutual product to that of Privilege Care. ( R. at 452-453). Mr. Ide
represented to Mr. Miller that Privilege Care was a health insurance plan that was
better than Employers Mutual. (R. at 453-454). Mr. Ide also filled out an
application for Privilege Care for Mr. Miller and his family. (R. at 454-455, State's
Exhibit 6. R. at 155).
In addition to Ms. Wilbert and Mr. Miller, Mr. Ide marketed Privilege Care to
an insurance agent. Mr. Doug Milne. Mr. Milne testified that Mr. Ide had
previously recruited him to market Employers Mutual. (R. at 407). Mr. Milne had
sold Employers Mutual to one of his clients. That client had problems getting the
Employers Mutual policy issued and other service problems. (R. at 408). Mr.
7

Milne testified that Mr. Ide contacted him on January 29, 2002, in an attempt to get
him to move that client to the Privilege Care program. (R. at 410-12).
Two employees of the department, Mr. Brian Hansen and Mr. Joe Taylor
testified that they had reviewed the Privilege Care program and determined that it
was unauthorized insurance. (R. at 425, 442, 461-62). They testified that they
informed Mr. Ide of that fact and obtained his commitment that he would not market
Privilege Care until the Department approved it. (R. at 425-26, 465).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should sustain the decision to revoke Mr. Ide's insurance license
because there is substantial evidence establishing that he marketed unauthorized
insurance products. He did this in violation of an uncontested Cease and Desist
Order. Despite the Cease and Desist Order, Mr. Ide made no efforts to determine
the validity of the additional product he received from some of the same persons
named in that Cease and Desist Order. Further, Mr. Ide ignored warnings from the
Insurance Department that those products were not authorized.
Mr. Ide has failed to properly marshal all the evidence in support of the
presiding officer's findings; therefore, his claim of insufficient evidence must fail.
Nevertheless, there exists more than substantial evidence in the record to support the
findings o( the presiding officer that Mr. Ide was assisting in marketing
unauthorized insurance and in violation of the Cease and Desist Order.
Throughout the proceeding before the Commissioner, the Department had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Ide had violated the
8
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Cease and Desist Order and the Utah Insurance Code by assisting in marketing
unauthorized insurance. That burden never shifted. However, once the Department
established a prima facie case that Mr. Ide committed the violations alleged, Mr. Ide
had the burden of going forward to establish any affirmative defenses he may have
had. Mr. Ide failed to meet that burden and presented no competent evidence that
his activities were exempt from department regulation. An insurance product, even
if marketed by a Professional Employer Organization, is still subject to regulation.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE EXISTS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT MR. IDE ASSISTED IN THE
MARKETING OF UNAUTHORIZED INSURANCE.
A.

Mr. Ide Failed To Properly Marshal The Evidence In Support
Of The Presiding Officer's Findings.

Mr. Ide challenges the presiding officer's finding that he marketed
unauthorized insurance in violation of the Cease and Desist Order and the Utah
Insurance Code, claiming that substantial evidence does not exist to support that
finding. The party challenging the finding must marshal all of the evidence
supporting that finding and show that despite the supporting facts, the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence. See First National Bank of Boston v. County
Board of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). In his brief Mr. Ide lists only
eight summary statements as his "marshaled facts" supporting the presiding
officer's findings. These summary statements gloss over the evidence presented and
are not a comprehensive statement of the evidence that was presented in the hearing

9

that supports the findings of the presiding officer. Further, Mr. Ide has failed to
properly marshal that evidence in support of those findings.
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellant court that the [trial] court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Valley City, v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)
(emphasis omitted).

*

Mr. Ide fails to discuss the evidence and how it supports the presiding
officer's findings, but after listing his limited summation of the evidence moves on
to his arguments against that limited summation of the evidence. Mr. Ide also
makes no mention of the exhibits that are part of the record in his "marshaling" of
the evidence. Those exhibits, in and of themselves, are substantial evidence
supporting the presiding officer's findings and are discussed below.
Having failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the presiding
officers findings, his challenge to those findings must fail.

10
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B.

Mr. Ide Was Marketing Unauthorized Insurance; More Than
Substantial Evidence Exists In The Record To Support The
Findings Of The Presiding Officer.

The Court should hold that the agency decision to revoke Mr. Ide's license
for marketing an unauthorized insurance product is supported by substantial
evidence.
The Utah Insurance Code prohibits any person from performing a long list of
acts that "may assist in the illegal placement of insurance with an unauthorized
insurer." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-15-102 (2001). It further prohibits any insurance
agent from perfomiing "any act that assists any person not authorized as an insurer
act as an insurer." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-405 (2001).
Insurance, under Utah law, is "an arrangement, contract or plan for the
transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to one or more other persons
...." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-301(63)(a) (Supp. 2002). Providing health care
benefits under a plan that constitutes a transfer of risk is defined as health insurance
in the Utah Insurance Code:
(a) "Health care insurance" or "health insurance" means insurance providing:
(i) health care benefits; or
(ii) payment of incurred health care expenses.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(55) (Supp. 2002). Further, the Utah Insurance Code
defines the business of insurance as including
(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (55), by
organizations that are or should be licensed under this title;
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(68) (Supp. 2002).

11

The evidence presented showed that Mr. Ide marketed a plan to his clients
that would provide health care benefits to them in exchange for the payment of a fee
or premium. Mr. Miller, a client of Mr. Ide, testified that Privilege Care was
presented to him as a health insurance plan. (R. at 453-54). Ms. Wilbert, another
client of Mr. Ide, testified that Mr. Ide stated that Privilege Care was insurance and
that she would receive health care benefits in exchange for a premium payment (R.
at 478-79, 482, 484).
Mr. Hansen, a Department employee, testified that Privilege Care was
"collecting premiums and paying claims, which means they're taking a risk, so that
makes them insurance." (R. at 444). Mr. Taylor, a Department employee, testified
that Privilege Care was providing health care benefits in exchange for payment of a
premium and that constitutes health insurance under the definition in the Utah
Insurance Code. (R. at 474-475). *
The exhibits presented at the hearing also demonstrate that Privilege Care is
health care insurance. The enrollment forms completed by Ms. Wilbert and for Mr.
Miller ask questions regarding previous health insurance, the existence of other
medical insurance, health questions regarding pre-existing conditions, pregnancy,
disability, current medications being taken, and previous hospitalization. (State's
Exhibit 5, R. at 153 and State's Exhibit 6, R. at 155). The packet of information
regarding Privilege Care given to Mr. Ide by Donald Smith of Five Star Marketing

1

No objection was made below to this evidence.
12

and presented to department employees when they visited him on January 24, 2002,
contained the following notable items:
(1)

an "Enrollment" form asking for medical and previous insurance
information (R. at 138-39);

(2)

a "Medical Questionnaire" (R. at 140-41);

(3)

an "Authorization Agreement for Preauthorized Payments" for
automatic drafting of premium payments from a person's bank
account (R. at 142);

(4)

an "Individual Underwriting 'Guide'" listing medical conditions
and their effect on underwriting applicants and a list of conditions
that would result in "Automatic Declines" (R. at 147-48);

(5)

a listing of benefits that Privilege Care would pay, including
amounts to be paid for services inside and outside of the network
(R. at 149); and,

(6)

a rate chart showing the rates charged for the plan for single,
double or family coverage (R. at 150).

Such an arrangement as that marketed by Mr. Ide constitutes the transfer of
the risk of payment for health care from the person purchasing the plan to the plan
operator who agrees to pay for that health care in exchange for the premium
received, the very definition of insurance. Privilege Care was engaged in the
insurance business. It provided health care insurance to its enrollees. However,
Privilege Care was not licensed to do an insurance business in the State of Utah (R.
13

at 435) and was, therefore, an unauthorized insurer. (See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1301(125) (Supp. 2002), an unauthorized insurer is an insurer not holding a valid
certificate of authority to do an insurance business in this state).
The testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits submitted constitute
substantial evidence supporting the presiding officer's finding that Mr. Ide was
assisting in marketing unauthorized insurance in violation of the Cease and Desist
Order and in violation of Utah law.

II.

ONLY THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WAS SHIFTED TO
MR. IDE, NOT THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
A.

The Administrative Law Judge Properly Placed The
Burden On the Department, Which The Department Met.

Mr. Ide misapprehends the course of proceedings before the presiding
officer. Mr. Ide claims that the presiding officer improperly shifted the burden of
proof from the Department and placed the burden on Mr. Ide to prove that he didn't
commit the violations alleged. This is a mischaracterization of what occurred.

*

The presiding officer stated in his Order on Hearing: "The 'burden of proof'
or 'burden of going forward' in this case as to the above issue(s) [whether Mr. Ide
violated the Cease and Desist Order and whether revocation of his license was the
appropriate penalty] is on the Complainant Department." (R. at 103, emphasis in
the original). Accordingly, there is no question that the burden was on the

I

Department. That burden had to be met by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah
Admin. Code R. 590-160-5(10).
i
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However, once the department presented its prima facie case that Mr. Ide
was assisting in the marketing of unauthorized insurance, the burden of going
forward shifted to Mr. Ide to establish any affirmative defenses he may have. See
State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (once the state establishes a
prima facie case of statutory violation the burden of going forward, i.e. of injecting
some competent evidence [of an affirmative defense], shifts to the defendant); Topp
v. Hayward, 746 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1987) (when the state has made its prime facie
case, the Appellant has the burden of going forward with affirmative evidence, not
with a bare allegation [of an affimiative defense]); Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d
290, 301; 300 P.2d 642, 650 (1956) (only the burden of going forward with the
evidence is shifted and the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff). The burden
on Mr. Ide was the burden of going forward with an affirmative defense, not the
burden of proof. The procedures below were not flawed.
Mr. Ide has not marshaled the evidence nor shown, as a matter of law, that
the product he was marketing was not insurance. The argument that what Mr. Ide
was selling was the services of a Professional Employer Organization ("PEO") and,
therefore, not insurance, is an affirmative defense, which he must raise as part of his
burden of going forward by the presentation of competent evidence and not just a

A Professional Employer Organization hires the employees of its client employers
and leases those employees back to the client employers. The PEO handles all
human resource matters and charges the client employers a fee for the leasing of the
employees based on the hourly rate paid to the employees plus the cost of employer
taxes, workers' compensation insurance, employees' benefits and the PEO's
overhead and profit.
15

bare assertion. (Topp, 746 P.2d at 785). In the Order on Hearing, the presiding
officer found that Mr. Ide was assisting in marketing unauthorized insurance (R. at
122, 124). After thorough analysis, the presiding officer found that Mr. Ide had
failed to establish an affirmative defense that Privilege Care was a PEO (R. at 12021) or that it was exempt from department regulation (R. at 121). The department
did establish & prima facie case that Mr. Ide was marketing unauthorized insurance
and the burden of going forward was then on Mr. Ide to establish his defenses,
which he failed to do. Therefore, the burden of proof was satisfied by the
department and was never overcome by Mr. Ide.
B.

Mr. Ide Failed To Carry His Burden Of Going Forward To
Establish An Affirmative Defense To The Charge Of Assisting
In Marketing Unauthorized Insurance.

Mr. Ide's defense to the charge that he assisted in marketing unauthorized
insurance was that the product he was marketing was the services of a PEO and not
insurance, unauthorized or otherwise.
Mr. Ide claims in his brief, without explaining why and without providing
any legal authority, "that he was selling a healthcare plan under a Professional
Employer's Organization (PEO) which is not an insurance product and, thus is
regulated outside of the insurance code." (Br. of Appellant at 5). This assertion is
unsupported. Mr. Ide cites legal authority to establish that PEO's are not regulated
by the Insurance Department in the State of Utah. However, it does not follow that
an insurance product marketed by a PEO is exempt from Insurance Department
regulation. Such a conclusion is a leap of logic and legal reasoning that cannot be
16

spanned. Providing for health care is strictly regulated under the Insurance Code.
The code states:
(2) Except under Subsection (3) or (4), a person may not directly or indirectly
provide health care, or arrange for, manage, or administer the provision or
arrangement of, collect advance payments for, or compensate providers of
health care unless authorized to do so or employed by someone authorized to
do so under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-4-106(2) (2001).
Under this section, no organization can provide or arrange for health care,
either directly or indirectly, unless it is an authorized insurer under one of the listed
chapters or it is specifically exempted. Neither applies here.
Therefore, an employer, including a PEO, may not provide a health care plan
to its employees unless it is underwritten by an authorized insurer or the employer
has established that it is otherwise exempt from state regulation. Certainly, if a PEO
cannot provide a health care plan to its own employees without complying with the
insurance code, it certainly cannot market that plan to non-employees without, at a
minimum, meeting those same requirements. Simply being a PEO does not remove
a health care plan marketed by that PEO from Insurance Department regulation.
Mr. Ide failed to establish any legal basis for his bald assertion that a PEO's
health care plan is not insurance and is regulated outside of the insurance code.
Therefore, Mr. Ide failed to meet his burden of going forward to establish an
affirmative defense to the charge that he assisted in marketing unauthorized
insurance.

17

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ide failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the findings of
the presiding officer. His claim of insufficient evidence must, therefore, fail. More
than substantial evidence exists in the record to support the findings of the presiding
officer. The presiding officer properly placed the burden of proof on the
Department to prove that Mr. Ide committed the violations alleged. Mr. Ide failed to
overcome the Department's case. Therefore, the Order of the Commissioner should
be affirmed.
DATED this

A

, "day of June, 2003.
/

uL

•'

M. Gale Lemmon
Assistant Attbrney General
Attorney for Utah Insurance Department

18

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this date I mailed, by regular mail postage
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the attached:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

To the following:
Gregory J. Sanders
Margaret R. Wakeham
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
/(

DATED this / . S ^ day of

,2003.

fL. -},!_<—

2

LL

L

M. Gale Lemnion
Assistant Attorney General
(

ADDENDUM

Order on Hearing
Order on Review
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(55) (Supp. 2002)
Ulan Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(63) (Supp. 2002)
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-405 (2001)

ADDENDUM "A"
Order on Hearing

BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COMPLAINANT:
UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

ORDER ON HEARING
(Formal Hearing)
DOCKET No. 2002-007-HL

RESPONDENT:

Mark E. Kleinfield,
Presiding Officer

GERALD G. IDE
111 East 5600 South, Suite 208
Murray, UT 84107
License No. 51030

FILE COPY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THIS MATTER, concerning whether Respondent's insurance agent license should be
revoked based on Respondent's alleged assistance in doing of an unauthorized insurance
business, came on to be heard before the Commissioner of the Utah State Insurance
Department ("Department") on the 24th day of April, 2002 at 9:00 o'clock A. M.
Mountain Time, with Mark E. Kleinfield, Administrative Law Judge, serving as
designated Presiding Officer.
Said hearing being held at the Department's offices located at the Utah State Office
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, having been convened at the
designated time of 9:00 A. M., April 24th, 2002 and adjourned at 1:47 P. M. on said same
day.
Appearances:
M. Gale Lemmon, Enforcement Counsel, Attorney for Complainant, Utah State
Insurance Department, State Office Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Gregory J. Sanders, Kipp & Christian, P. C, Attorney for Respondent, 10 Exchange
Place, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

By the Presiding Officer:
Pursuant to a March 20th, 2002 Pre-Hearing Conference Order a hearing was
conducted on April 24th, 2002 in the above-entitled proceeding. The Respondent was
present at that time.
The hearing was convened and conducted as a formal hearing in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-46b-6, 63-46b-7, 63-46b-8, 63-46b-9 and 63-46b-10 and
Administrative Rule R590-160-6.

ISSUE, BURDEN and 'STANDARD OF PROOF"
1. The basic issue(s) in this case is (are):
a. Whether the Respondent violated the terms of the Commissioner's December 6th,
2001 Cease and Desist Order and or Section 31A-15-102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended,
by assisting in the doing of an unauthorized insurance business!; and
b. And if so is revocation of Respondent's license or a lesser penalty the appropriate
penalty?
(SEE also Paragraph 2 under DISCUSSION-ANALYSIS.)
2. The "burden ofproof or "burden of going forward" in this case as to the above
issue(s) is on the Complainant Department.
3. As per Utah Administrative Code Rule, R590-160-5.J as to the above and foregoing
"issue(s)" or "question(s)" to be answered the "standard ofproof as to issues of fact is
to be proven by a "preponderance of the evidenceff.

The Complainant offered an opening statement. The Respondent waived opening
statement.
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
Witnesses:
For the Complainant Department:
1. Doug Milne, Insurance Agent, 9583 Shoshone Circle, Sandy, Utah 84092.

2. Brian Hansen, Market Conduct Examiner, Utah Insurance Department, State Office
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
3. Kirk C. Miller, Insured Consumer, 1601 Pony Express Way, Centerville, Utah
84014.
4. Joe Taylor, Market Conduct Examiner, Utah Insurance Department, State Office
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
5. Karen Wilbert, Insured Consumer, 516 East 450 South, Santaquin, Utah 84655. Ms.
Wilbert testified via telephone ((801) 754-5045).
For the Respondent:
1. Michael E. Garnett, Senior Vice-president, Privilege Care PEO, 110 Monte Aveue,
Suite 209, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057. Mr. Garnett testified via telephone ((609)
685-6122).
2. Gerald G. Ide, Respondent, 111 East 5600 South, Suite 708, Murray, Utah 84107.
All of whom were sworn and testified.
Exhibits:
The Complainant Department offered the following exhibits:
1. Complainant's Exhibit No. 1, consisting of seven (7) type written or printed
pages, being a copy of a December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order issued in Docket
No. 2001-242-HL, Utah Insurance Department, Complainant, Employers Mutual, LLC,
et al, including "JERRY IDE, License No. 51030, 111 E. 5600 S., Suite 208 Murray, UT
84107".
2. Complainant's Exhibit No. 2, consisting of one (1) type written or printed page,
being a copy of a January 7, 2002 letter from Five Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive,
Piano, Texas 75075 to Consultants & Managers.
3 Complainant's Exhibit No. 3, consisting of sixteen (16) type written or printed
pages, being a copy of various documents regarding Privilege Care and Five Star
Marketing, including application form, contractual agreement, new business turn-in
form, medical questionnaire, etc.
4. Complainant's Exhibit No. 4, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages,
being a copy of (page 1) a February 5, 2002 letter from Gerald G. Ide to Brian Hansen,
Utah State Insurance Department, Salt Lake City, Utah regarding Fax to Five Star
Marketing, and a copy of (page 2) a February 4, 2002 letter from Gerald G. Ide to Five

Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 regarding termination of
contract.
5. Complainant's Exhibit No. 5, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages,
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED application-enrollment of one Karen K.
Wilbert as regards Privilege Care. Second page indicates a hand-written receipt for
$424.00 to the said Karen K. Wilbert from one Jerry Ide.
6. Complainant's Exhibit No. 6, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages,
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED application-enrollment of one Kirk C.
Miller as regards Privilege Care. Second page is a blank copy of a Privilege Care Inc.
PEO Contractual Agreement.
7. Complainant's Exhibit No. 7, consisting of one (1) type written or printed page,
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED letter from one Doug Milne to a Mr. Taylor
regarding Jerry Ide and a "new program that replaced ERISA". Top of letter shows a Fax
date of February 4, 2002.
8. Complainant's Exhibit No. 8, consisting of seventeen (17) type written or printed
pages, being a copy of a 1992 U. S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare benefits
Administration publication entitled: "MEWAs Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements
Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act: A Guide to Federal and State
Regulation'.
9. Complainant's Exhibit No. 9, consisting of fifteen (15) type written or printed
pages, being a copy of a March 24, 1990 National Association of Insurance
Commissioners publication entitled: "ERISA" by John Keene, U. S. Department of Labor,
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration.
10. Complainant's Exhibit No. 10, consisting of sixteen (16) type written or printed
pages, being a copies of four (4) separate newsletters of the Utah Department of
Insurance, each containing four (4) pages, being the respective January 1990, January
1992, Winter 1993/94 and Summer 1994 issues. Each issue containing an article
concerning ERISA and or unauthorized insurers, amongst other articles.
(No objection being made all of which Complainant's exhibits were accepted and
entered, except for Complainant's Exhibit No. 2 which was not formally offered by the
Complainant.)

The Respondent offered the following exhibits:
1. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, consisting of one (1) page of typed and or printed
materials, being a copy of an (UNSIGNED) January 9, 2002 letter from as testified to by
Gerald G. Ide, Respondent, from Five Star Marketing to Consultants & Managers,
regarding Employers Mutual plan and "New Companies to Market".

2. Resp< >ndent! s Exhibit No. 2, coi isisting of one ^ ; r ^ oi iv^cu a; J. o; •
matenals, being a copy of an (UNSIGNED) March 25, 2002 letter as testified to L,J
Gerald G. Ide. Respondent, from Privilege Cau SH V -.
\ - u:> i ^nccm", regarding
Gerald G. Ide and hiMehiti^r^h , • ^ Puvilegc C u r
.^ Respondent s IWIUL*.
-*•; *
,i J ij., vft> ped ai id oi pi n ited
materials, being a copy o f d i v . . ,.ar> 24, ^ - _ i/it/.n u . in r fiom Don R. SmithJFive
Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, TexaN "50 * u» Whom it inay concern"
regarding Gerald G. Ide and his relationship with Five Star Marketing.
1. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, coi isisting of oi le (1) page of t> ped ai id oi pi ii ited
matenals, being a copy of a February 22, 2002 letter from James M. Doyle, President,
Privilege Care Marketing Group, P. O. Box 177, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057 to
"whom it may concern." regarding Gerald Ide and 1 lis relationship with Privilege Care
Marketing Group.
5. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, consisting oi two C pagt s of tvped ..:;u vi pimted
materials, being a copy of a January 22, 2002 l-iix hmn I »aiene (NO LAST NAMhK Five
Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 u Nathan r\-. r k l e g g i n g
Privilege Care New Business Procedure^ effective 02-01 '•)?_
6. Respoiident's Exhibit No. 6, consisting of tw-jnn ui ;2J) pages tit typed .»nd **.
printed materials, being copies of twenty i^o (22) sepaiatc individual^ with va-ie-.is dates
being "letters of support, and t hanit'ici" as regards Ger<ihi (• I<v

(No objecnon being made -Ainch exhibits were accepted and entered, except for
Respondent's hxlubn No 2 which was accepted and entered »\er objection of the
Complain -.v:- and Respondent's F\!:ibu N7^ ^ which was wit x'M^n bv ?he Respondent I

Argument Iollowed,

" I he Presiding Off icer being tuny advised in the premises ai id uiMiig auumu • -. *v e
notice of the files and records of the Department, now enters his Findhn-s off ..
Conclusions of Law, and Order, on behalf of the Department:

FINDINGS OF FACT
I, find by a preponderance of the evidence, the following facts:
Preliminary-Procedural Facts
(Paragraphs 1-11)

1. The Utah Insurance Department {"Department") is a governmental entity of the
State of Utah. The Department as per Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-2-101 is empowered
to administer the Insurance Code, Title 31A, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.
2. The Respondent, GERALD G. IDE, is:
a. a licensed insurance agent having obtained and maintained present License No.
51030 since on or about December 29, 1983, currently suspended as per Emergency
Proceeding Suspension of License Order under date of February 6th, 2002; and
b. presently maintains a principal business address of 111 East 5600 South, Suite
208, Murray, Utah 84107.
3. a. The Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department issued his Cease and Desist
Order under date of December 6 , 2001 directed to the Respondent amongst others in
regards to the assisting of an unauthorized insurance business, namely Employers Mutual,
LLC as allegedly exempt from the laws of the State of Utah as per the federal Employers
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and allegedly marketed by Five Star Marketing,
in the State of Utah, in violation of Section 31A-15-102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended; and
b. The Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department issued his Cease and Desist
Order under date of December 6l , 2001 directed to the Respondent amongst others in to
"immediately Cease and Desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized
insurance business in the State of Utah, including soliciting, marketing, or proposing to
make an insurance contract, taking receiving or forwarding an application for insurance,
collecting or receiving, in full or in part, any insurance premium, issuing or delivering an
insurance policy or other evidence of an insurance contract, publishing or disseminating
any advertisement or information for insurance, for any unauthorized insurer."
(Paragraph 2, Page 6, December 6th, 2002 Cease and Desist Order, Docket 2001-242HL). (EMPHASIS ADDED).
4. The Department on or about February 6th, 2002 filed its Complaint alleging those
violations as set forth in Paragraph 1 of Issue, Burden and Standard of Proof above, and
issued a Notice of Formal Proceeding Adjudicative Proceeding and Pre-Hearing
Conference, being Docket No. 2002-007-HL, to the Respondent. A copy of said Notice
being mailed to the Respondent at his referenced business address on or about February
6th, 2002.
5. The Respondent filed his Answer on March 6th, 2002.

6. The Complainant filed its Motion for Summary , Judgment on March 7 , 2002.
n

\ Pre Ut waig i
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.-^j pes aMuK.ii ! ^\ 2002 \oiut . 7 < ^'in^uain'c (*l Heating the March 1 •"' .'*:
Prehearing Conierem.e was continued u Mai- h 20 :h . 2 H O at 10:00 - M..
w.

9. The Respondent iiled his /Wo;,
proposed A/?^ni^d Armi w on M™

f

/..-air i.
' °0(r

*-. •

,0 ., A /Vr Hearing Conference was held on March 20 th , 2002 at 10:00 A M and a
Pre-Hearing Conference Order issued on March 20 th , 2002 setting said matter for
hearing on Apul 24th "?O02 i it 9:00 o'cloi :k A 1 1 ;
b. I 'he Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied at said Pre
Hearing Conference.
h i he Respondent with leave oi
•
H n:*i i? Con ferenee on March 20 , 2002.

i uded Ans H >er at said Pre-

hat ba^ed on the preliminary facts as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 1 ^
immediate!) ,;h<we, a hearing was held on April ?*ilh ° n m ,»? o no . \-\t~ k A "

Operative Facts
(Paragraphs 12 20)

12. i'hr Department mi .«i abmit Deecmbei O \ 2001 ;• wed -^ Lt ast and DL^LM Order,
being Docket N<- .100}-.1*5 ' HL. oiden;^ the Responden . .: i—£ ^ith others, 10
"immediately cease and desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthotu ed
insurance business in the State of Utah, including soliciting, marketing, or pti-n* '-me : »
make an insurance contract ... publishing or disseminating any advertisement o*
information for insurance, for any unauthorized insure!
i hMPHASIS ADDI:,D>
13. a.i. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst tweiity seven (27) total Respondents, in
such December 6 th , 2001 Cease and Desist Order was an entity located in the State of
Texas known as Five Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 750 75 which
was promoting and marketing unauthorized insurance, namely Employers Mutual, LLC,
through agents in various states, including the present Respondent in the State of I Ita h;
and
n. lnuiuicu as a Co-Respondeui amongst m e m \ ^e\en (2~) total Respondent-, n
such December (>:!\ 2001 Cease and Desist Older was o \ /> -n R ^miih 111? EdgefieiO
Drue, Phmo Texas 7 5l)75 m office! .r.d or employee o! said Fi\e Star Marketing, MM

!

OA. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in
December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was an entity located in the State of

New Jersey known as American Benefit Society, 141 Ganttown Road, Suite E,
Turnersville, New Jersey 08012 which was operating as a third party administrator for
said Employers Mutual, LLC; and
ii. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in
such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was one Jim Doyle, 141 Ganttown
Road, Suite E, Turnersville, New Jersey 08012, an officer and or employee of said
American Benefit Society.
14. Since the issuance of such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order, Respondent
has continued to assist Five Star Marketing and or others, including one Don R. Smith,
and one Jim Doyle, both named in said December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order, in
promoting and soliciting the sale of another unauthorized insurance, namely Privilege
Care, in the State of Utah, in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order.
15. On or about January 8th, 2002, Respondent contacted a resident of the State of Utah,
one Karen Wilbert, Santaquin, Utah and solicited health care insurance known as
Privilege Care, which Respondent claimed was underwritten by Union Labor Life
Insurance Company. On or about January 10th, 2002, Respondent took an application
from such person and collected premium in the amount of $424.00.
16. The Respondent was advised in person by representatives of the Department on or
about January 24th, 2002, that the Privilege Care program was not underwritten by the
Union Labor Life Insurance Company, and that Five Star Marketing was not to do any
business in the State of Utah, and that Privilege Care was an unauthorized insurer.
17. On or about January 25th, 2002, Respondent contacted another resident of the State
of Utah, one Kirk C. Miller, Centerville, Utah and solicited health care insurance through
Privilege Care.
18. On or about January 29th, 2002, Respondent contacted a licensed agent, Doug
Milne, in the State of Utah, and provided such agent infoirnation and application forms to
deliver to a Mr. Milne's client, a resident of the State of Utah, to enroll such person in
Privilege Care in place of a previously written Employers Mutual, LLC policy.
19. Privilege Care is being promoted by Five Star Marketing and Privilege Care
Marketing Group, Inc., which claims that it is/was underwritten by the Union Labor Life
Insurance Company. The Union Labor Life Insurance Company has denied that it is/was
underwriting any program known as Privilege Care and denies any knowledge of such
program.
20. Privilege Care is/was not authorized to be in the insurance business in the State of
Utah.

DISCUSSION-ANALYSIS
(Paragraphs 1-21)

1. a. Both the Respondent ai id the Department in large measure while advoc.
clearly different characterizations or interpretations of the above referenced operative
facts in substance concurred as to the basic chronology and core facts.
!>. 1 DC ICL-UiU l i n n i ^ i i 11. ,< - • •' • f-ntr\ , *f \hr following ::n:ilv*:is.
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• : r »etent and credible evidence for

2. The question(s) presented is:
a Whether the Respondent's actions are violative the Commissi! *ncr's Decemin i
(/' w n (*?ase and Desist Order and or of Utah Code Ann. Sectmi :) l \z 1 ^ " ; ; ^ ,
;

t the Respondent has so violated both or eitlici ui :,aiu uommissioiu i •
December 6 l \ 2001 Cease and Desist Order or said cit^- *» w tor\ ^rtion wh.-^
iy
the appropri""* penalty to be imposed1''; and
'•*. iu ;iif r as per Utah Administrative Code Rule, R590-160-5.J as to each of the
above and foregoing "issue(s)" or "question(s)" to be answered the "standard of proof
as to issues of fact have been prrv -r* k v •? "nw.rv,,,,/,.,-,-/!?,-,* nfihf ,M ulencr"!
3. Applicable Pertinent Statutes and Administrative Rules are as follows (although
others may be otherwise specifically cited within the bod) of this "lOrder on Hearing"):
a „ i . > . C v . '

31A-- I

•

:

-:•"-

?H orization to do in^unim*. l u ^ , m ^

A persoT- :M;-\ n^t engage in the loll-.»\\in;j wit- •••it implying with this title:
(

• • .

. . .!.-•.

: y>:< i ^

(2) ad a- -At n.suKinn .I'jLiil \n- k.i,
:-•) or

.

. 1 \
"A* u<u .

:

, j ,

b l a

;

il \

'

0i;

/

\ I A ,!<> ill ]

i.

(3) engage in inst irance adju^im 1 a*- iiL-lm, ..
\}

ti

.....,JI

|es:

'cfinitions.
- \sc \pccifinl

(64) "Insurance business'"" or "bush less of w>. .i...i;:v.

: •. —

(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (51), by organizations
that are or should be licensed under this title;
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event of contingencies not within the
control of the employees, in which the employees are entitled to the benefits as a right,
which benefits may be provided either:
(i) by single employers or by multiple employer groups; or
(ii) through trusts, associations, or other entities;
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in return for gifts, except those
provided by persons specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and (3);
(d) providing the characteristic services of motor clubs as outlined in Subsection
(77);
(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsection (59);
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make as insurer,
guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insurance;
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insurance, including
solicitation, negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of a contract of title
insurance, insuring, and transacting matters subsequent to the execution of the contract
and arising out of it, including reinsurance; and
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent to Subsections
(64)(a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this title.
b. i. Section 31A-1-105 states:
31A-1-105. Presumption of jurisdiction.
(1) Any insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter
33, that provides coverage of a resident of this state, property located in this state, or a
business activity conducted in this state, or that engages in any activity described in
Subsections 31 A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), is:
(a) doing an insurance business in this state; and
(b) subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this
state under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310 to the extent of that coverage or activity.
(2) Any person doing or purporting to do an insurance business in this state as
defined in Section 31A-1-301 is subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner
and this title, unless the insurer can establish that the exemptions of Section 31A-1-103
apply.
(3) This section does not limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under other
applicable law.

(EMPHASIS ADDED).
ii. Subsection UA 1- III '-I 3H,t| \lak !,.
»pe aiid applicability of title.
"i}) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not apply to;
a) those activities of an insurer where state jurisdiction is preempted by
Section 511 . * *u * f-rWn! E^Hove^ Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended"'
, Sub-CLtioi. "1 \~2-201(4)(a) states:

"(4)(a* I i r commissioner shall issue prohibitory, mandatory, and other orders
necessary to secure compliance with this t itle. An order by the commissioner is not
effective imless the order:
(i) is in writing; and
(ii) is signed by the commissioner or imik-i : "c .*: uni-.Monef s authority."
d. Subsection 31 A-2-308(l)(a) and (b) states:
31A-^-*<»s. Enforcemen ;>i-naltit-s .md piocedures.
"(1) (a) A person who violate an\ : finance MaUii : ;»JK- OI any order issued under
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) shall forfeit t. ;!,i Male iwiu m. .i • ••ui.t o! .IM\ profit gained
from the \ <o!an< p m ,HMii.»in to any oilvr ! Ji'.nuieoi
• •;•'% imposed.
(b) 0 l"!n , ommissioiKT nuy ouk-: ,;i individual agent, hiokei. adjuster, or iilsurance
consultant \\\w folates an insurance -i iiuu o: inlr to '.-IUM to ' V state not more than
$2,500 for each violation.
(ii* 7!,;- i oir.in^sioTici i i lay order any othei pei son ->>.i • "olau*s an insurance statute
c; pilv !o t,ni, •: ir tho state not more than $5,000 for each violation/'
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e Suhse. - < *. ^>lA-2-308(10) states:
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nforcement penalties and proerdm s

""(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissions may- m wm-,c ut ... F . i i t ; .evoke,
suspend, place on probation, limit, or refuse to renew the licensee's license or certificate
of authority
(i) wl iei; o W . L U S C C .-I
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(A) per >ie:ul\ i i substantially violates tin- insurance la
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:

(B) violates an order of the commissioner under Subsection 31A-2-201(4);
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceedings against the licensee under
Section 31A-27-301 or Section 31A-27-307; or
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the conduct of the licensee's business
endanger, or the licensee's financial resources are inadequate to safeguard, the legitimate
interests of the licensee's customers and the public.
(b) Additional license termination or probation provisions for licensees other than
insurers are set forth in Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 31A-23-216, 31A-23-217,
31A-25-208, 31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-214, 31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503."
(EMPHASIS ADDED).
f. Section 31A-4-106 states:
31A-4-106. Provision of health care.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same definition as in
Section 78-14-3.
(2) Except under Subsection (3) or (4), a person may not directly or indirectly
provide health care, or arrange for, manage, or administer the provision or arrangement
of, collect advance payments for, or compensate providers of health care unless
authorized to do so or employed by someone authorized to do so under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9,
or 14.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to:
(a) a natural person or professional corporation that alone or with others
professionally associated with the natural person or professional corporation, and without
receiving consideration for services in advance of the need for a particular service,
provides the service personally with the aid of nonprofessional assistants;
(b) a health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which:
(i) is licensed or exempt from licensing under Title 26, Chapter 21; and
(ii) does not engage in health care insurance as defined under Section 31 A-1-301;
(c) a person who files with the commissioner under Section 31A-1-105 a
certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or other evidence
satisfactory to the commissioner, showing that the laws of Utah are preempted
under Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or other
federal law;
(d) a person licensed under Chapter 23 who:
(i) has arranged for the insurance of all services under:
(A) Subsection (2) by an insurer authorized to do business in Utah;

'R> Section ; 1A
oloyei tl lat c omplies with Chap*"'

!

* ;>r

u . an employe: ji.ii idl-lunds its obligations to provide in..::!, ait; • emu's nr
indemnitv '••• 'Kompio\ee * *' ^ employer complies with Chapt^i : •
v \t

\ [H * IIK.) \\^\ , IOMCIC administrative or management services for any other
person subject to Subsection (2) and not exempt under Subsection (3) unless the person is
an authorized insi irer under Chapter 5, 7. 8, 9, or 14 or c omplies with Chapter 25.
(5) It is unlawful for any insui er or pei son providing, administering, oi managing
health care insurance under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14 to enter into a contract that limits a
health care provider's ability to advise the health care providers patients or clients fully
about treatment options or other issues that affect the health caa <:•! \\w • M care
provider's patients oi clients.
(EMPHA i
g Seem3,

fir
ll

\ ^ 1 0 ? Mate<:

•

( h V > j . ' i-n \UA\ UIMIIV acu numerated under Subsection (2) who knows or should
know thai the act may assist in the illegal placement of insurance with an unauthorized
insurer or the subsequent servicing of an insurance policy illegally placed with an
unauthorized insurer.
(2) An act performed by n mil is peri ormed both at tl le place of n lailing ai id at the
place of delivery. Any of the following acts, whether performed by mail or otherwise, fall
within the prohibition of Subsection (1):
(.i»*<!

•

•. * .

i. ;•...«.

a. ;;•• i-iM :-ncf contract;

(b) taking, i e c e i \ i n g , M UJIW aiding .in .:; \ -:. >-:

ince;"

(c) colic* tine oi K'Ln\:'i- m !.»!!.•; •*.*.: .:•* .c -iM.-.anct* premium;
(d) issuing v>: dehvcjint ai. nsurance policy o; t^ T evidence ol a
,<\u *! •
contract except as a messenger not einployed b> -In ^>ce: J n^a:iaiue i *.i
broker;
(e) doing any of the following in connection with the soliutatim;
niaii.-:
procuring, or effectuatioi i of insurance coverage for another; inspecting iiskv sc:: m:
rates, advertising, disseminating information, or advising on risk managemr*
iff j .bhshing oi dis a_;r.wianng ,i-\\ advertisemei it encouraging the placement oi
servicing ol insurance tha- -Aould M^ia-c Subsection (1); however this provision does not
:)pl> to publication oi dissemination to an audience primarily outside Utah that also
reaches persons in Utah unless the extension to persons inside Utah can be conveniently
avoided without substantial expense other than loss of revenue; nor does it apply to

regional or national network programs on radio or television unless they originate in
Utah;
(g) investigating, settling, adjusting, or litigating claims; or
(h) representing or assisting any person to do an unauthorized insurance business or
to procure insurance from an unauthorized insurer.
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit:
(a) an attorney acting for a client;
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an insured acting in the capacity of an insurance
buyer or manager; or
(c) insurance activities described under Section 31A-15-103.
(4) Any act performed in Utah which is prohibited under this section constitutes
appointment of the commissioner or the lieutenant governor as agent for service of
process under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310.
(EMPHASIS ADDED).
h. Section 31A-23-216 states in part:
31A-23-216. Termination of license.
"(1) A license issued under this chapter remains in force until:
(a) revoked, suspended, or limited under Subsection (2);
(b) lapsed under Subsection (3);
(c) surrendered to and accepted by the commissioner; or
(d) the licensee dies or is adjudicated incompetent as defined under Title 75, Chapter
5, Part 3, Guardians of Incapacitated Persons or Part 4, Protection of Property of Persons
Under Disability and Minors.
(2) (a) If the commissioner makes a finding under Subsection (2)(b), after an
adjudicative proceeding under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, the
commissioner may:
(i) revoke a license of an agent, broker, surplus lines broker, or consultant;
(ii) suspend for a specified period of 12 months or less a license of an agent, broker,
surplus lines broker, or consultant; or
(iii) limit in whole or in part the license of any agent, broker, surplus lines broker, or
consultant.
(b) The commissioner may take an action described in Subsection (2)(a) if the
commissioner finds that the licensee:

.. 111.::: J -'-J i u a iuense under Section 31A-23-203;
1:
(A) an insurance statute;
iB } a mlc Miai i-- \ Jul undn Subsection 31 A-2-201f r * oi

^z ;f; %. $z %.

i. Section a J \ 7^ ^ ' Mtes*

i

31A-23-405. ^crvjct^ J»I rf'oiim'ri lo« utwiuthrti/eri insurers.
(1) A peison licensed under Oiapter 2" -aa :. *: perform any act that assists any
person not authorized as an aisuiei to act as t:\ msi.iei
(2) It ift - .«..*.....>«
.'- M*!iu!i:<> issist any person pu ,i»u tinj; to lit exempt
from state i n s u i a i m .,...-.» n U ^ITIIOII SMl nl MM I mployee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1**74, unless that person has r e l u p n d the presumption f
jurisdiction under Section 31 l
<'*> It-^'.-ti violation i*f i!u< <- Mo •
- i M •", ^ :. • . d in bcii insurance as defii led under Section 31 A-l-301; or
(b) for a surplus
31 A-15-103.

IIHCN

hioher to engage n, tl le placei i lei it :)f ii isi n a:i ice I n idei Section

(EMPHASIS ADDED).
j Section ,lt: "" - ' !! ' I M ! : '! bmpLnct

lu iih nn »n I'.M I nit S\ < nni\ ,\i I \*f IV*! reads tn
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Oihu ".tv.s (ERISA see "1 T

(a) Supersedure; riu-i m t u<iit. L - ^ ,
-o; ... >„,,. .ction (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter and sulu ,
t . . .f *Mis chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as thc\ ina\ im>v wi Mm- 'Mc] t lau tr- any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title. This section shall take effect on Januarv 1 10'nc
HI < ' I I I I M

II

Mo in 11 nil1 application.

! i \ nr- section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, or
any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975

(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of
services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title.
(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State.
(5) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) of this section shall
not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. 393-1 through
393-51).
(B)
(Q
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section (i) in the case of an employee welfare benefit plan which is a multiple
employer welfare arrangement and is fully insured (or which is a multiple employer
welfare arrangement subject to an exemption under subparagraph (B)), any law of any
State which regulates insurance may apply to such arrangement to the extent that such
law provides (I) standards, requiring the maintenance of specified levels of reserves and
specified levels of contributions, which any such plan, or any trust established under such
a plan, must meet in order to be considered under such law able to pay benefits in full
when due, and
(II) provisions to enforce such standards, and
(ii) in the case of any other employee welfare benefit plan which is a multiple
employer welfare arrangement, in addition to this subchapter, any law of any State which
regulates insurance may apply to the extent not inconsistent with the preceding sections
of this subchapter.

(B) The Secretary may, under regulations which may be prescribed by the
Secretary, exempt from subparagraph (A)(ii), individually or by class, multiple employer
welfare arrangements which are not fully insured. Any such exemption may be granted
with respect to any arrangement or class of arrangements only if such arrangement or
each arrangement which is a member of such class meets the requirements of section
1002(1) and section 1003 of this title necessary to be coi isidei ed an employee welf are
benefit PLU »• *A hu:h this subchapter applies.
(C) Nothing in subparagraph v/v - i u , i l ^Mcct the mai n lei 01 extent to which I hi1
provisions of this subchapter apply to an employee welfare benefit plan which is not a
multiple employer welfare arrangement and which is a pla n, fund, or program.
participating in, subscribing to, or otherwise using a multiple employer welfare
arrangement to fi ind or administer benefits to such plan's participants and beneficiaries.
(D) For purposes of this paragraph, u multiple employer welfare arrangement shall be
considered fully insured only if the term!-, of the arrangement provide for benefits the
amount of all of wl licl i tl le Secretary determines are guaranteed under a contract, or
policy of insurance, issued by an insurance company, insurance service, or insi irance
organization, qualified to conduct bi isiness in a State.
"i S ibHVi.on u ) o t tin- ^ehon -h A\ n<>i -ippi> i* qualified domestic relations
ordei^
qualified mrdka; hM Mipport rulers
•< rS^% enent they apply to
qualified medical child -upp^:t ; uki^
{b) ' -:
of action

' •;. .\) ui liub section oiidli not be cunsu^d ;u r icclude any State cause

(A) with respect to which the State exeicises its acquiied n-m . .,jci section
1169(b)(3) of this title with respect to a group health plan (as defined in section 1167(1)
of this titled -i
A'i) un recoupment of payment with respect to items or services pursuant to a
S'.jic plan ivi medical assistance approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act , .
.'V 1-ur additional provisions relating to group health plans,, see section I l i 'i .*t vw
\\ i Diliiiiliiiiiiii1"- 1

puipusi's ol this " nrfioii*

(1) I he tei m "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or oil lei
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable
only to the District of Coli imbia shall be treated as a State law i ather than a law of the
I Jnited States.

(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or
supersedure of any law of the United States prohibited. Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the
United States (except as provided in sections 1031 and 1137(c) of this title) or any rule or
regulation issued under any such law.
(EMPHASIS ADDED).
4. a. i. Without extensive elaboration of the Respondent's actions which the Court will
dispense with such can be said to be clearly in assistance to one doing an insurance-like
business.
ii. Whether application forms were or were not handed-in or whether money was
collected and was or was not handed-in or whether policies were or were not delivered is
in so many words irrelevant.
iii. The activities referenced in Subsection 31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h) are
fairly encompassing. One could venture to say that the Respondent in one form or
another took part to a greater or lesser extent in all of such.
b.i. The heart or determinative issue is whether or not both of or either of the two
(2) companies the Respondent represented and solicited on behalf of and thus assisted
were or were not exempt form the jurisdiction of the Utah Insurance Code.
ii. (A) If within the jurisdiction of the Code such companies should be registered
with the Department and absent such registration such companies are doing an
unauthorized insurance business and the Respondent's assistance thereof would be in
violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order as well as Section 31A-15102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended; or
(B) If exempt from the coverage of the Code such companies need not be
registered and whatever the Respondent's assistance thereof such would not be in
violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order as well as Section 31A-15102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended.

1

It is clear from the testimony of Ms. Wilbert and Mr. Miller they thought that the Respondent was selling
and that they were buying health care insurance.
2
Absent Subsection 31A-15-102(2)(d) "issuing or delivering an insurance policy" which is one of the
problems with the Respondent and the companies he represented — policies and coverage were promised,
but were never delivered and coverage never extended. Suffice it to say the Respondent "assisted" and
advanced both of the named entities' interests by Respondent's actions irrespective if money did or did not
change hands from Ms. Wilbert and or Mr. Miller and or Mr. Milne's unnamed client to either of the
named "insurers". SEE "Findings of Fact" No.s 15, 17 and 18, above.

j -s Scv in;:. 5 i A-1 l*n creates a "presumption of jurisdiction7 "i mless the insurer can
establish thai the exemptions of Section M A- ' '03 apply
31 J""V-I 103 is found in Subsection
3lA-l-iUJpHd/ wherein it states: "(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided this title
does not applv to: (a) those activities of .m msuiei where state jurisdiction is preempted
by Section 514 of the federal Employee Income Sn urit) • Act of 1974, as amended",
c^mnnnh called "ERTS V
v. i. SCLIUJII si A \ M'fM?) establishes a meel lanisrn whereby a purported ERISA
cntit\ providing "health cau- benefits" n lay "i ebut" such presumption of jurisdiction and
pi ove its exemption status.
ii. "[A] person -; v*r
^ho lilt -. ^ t|* tin nunmissicnt
, iriir
Section ' S \ I n^ ., «.-i : j*'n al< :
tin i :t\u t\ v ^tes Department of Labor, vr
other tviclence satisfailnt \ to tlu loitunisMoner, showing that the laws of Utah are
preempted under Section 514 of the I-•""*-** <•< Retirpmenf Income Security Art of
1974 or other federal law" is exempted.
";'\ in!e r , ic was tcstiinony from Mr. Garnett to the effect "that Privilege Care PEO
has everything in order with [LJabor" the record is devoid of any certificate from the
United States Department of I ,abor regarding either Employers Muti ial, I I ,C and or
Privilege Care PEO.
. Such lack of a certificate from the United States Department of Labor leads the
Court to review and weigh as per Subsection 31 A-4-106(3) what "other evidence", if any,
"satisfactory to the commissioner'' is in the record "showing that the laws of Utah are
preempted1.
8. a. Respondent through counsel argued that both Eiiiployers Mutual, I.LA, and
Privilege Care PEO are "employee leasing companies" or "professional employer
organizations" ("PEO") offering and administering "ERISA" sanctioned health benefits
programs to small employer groups. SEE Chapter 59 of Title 58, "Professional Employer
Organization Licensing Act".
t It "' 'c i lid apf eai til \i 11 }EOs cai i qi lalif y as ER IS \ sai :i ::t:ioi led ei itities
9. While coin lsel for the Respondent argued that Employers Mutual, LLC was a PEO
and an ERISA program there is no defii litive nor conclusive testimonial or documentary
evidence in the record in the Court's mind to sustain such. Accordingly the Court finds
that Employers Mutual, LLC is not a PEO offering an ERISA sanctioned prnprnn^ or
otherwise.

lO.a. As to Privilege Care PEO there was testimony from Mr. Garnett and "selfproving" documentary exhibits that Privilege Care PEO is a "professional employer
organization.
b.i. Privilege Care PEO though is not registered with the Utah Department of
Commerce which has specific jurisdiction over PEOs.

ii. As advanced by counsel for the Respondent and per Mr. Garnett's testimony as
per Section 58-59-305(2) "a professional employer organization, which is not domiciled
in this state, and which employs less than 25 employees working within this state" is
exempt from licensure under Chapter 59 of Title 58. Privilege Care PEO is not domiciled
in Utah nor does it have 25 or more employees working within this state.
iii. Privilege Care PEO need not be licensed as a PEO.
11. While Respondent's and Privilege Care PEO's evidentiary proof can be said to be
"self-proving or "self-serving" arguendo assuming Privilege Care PEO is a PEO is the
health benefits program it offers to "employers" amongst other PEO benefits such as to
be ERISA sanctioned and pre-empted from the laws of the State of Utah and the
jurisdiction of the Utah Insurance Department?
12. a. As per Paragraph 6, above, "[WJhile there was testimony from Mr. Garnett to the
effect "that Privilege Care PEO has everything in order with [LJabor" the record is again
devoid of any certificate from the United States Department of Labor regarding
Privilege Care PEO" or anything other than such statement in the record.
b. The testimony of Mr. Garnett and the advanced documentary evidence as to .
Privilege Care PEO being an ERISA sanctioned benefits program is "self-proving" and
"self-serving".
c. No literature other than some token letters lacking even a letterhead in some
instances was presented. No articles of incorporation nor the arguably determinative
"agreement" with the labor union repeatedly spoken of by Mr. Garnett were presented.
13. The "burden" of proving such exemption to the satisfaction of the Commissioner is
on the entity tendering such. Here Privilege Care PEO itself has not made an "application
for exemption", but such has been advanced by the Respondent as a defense. The burden
accordingly in such circumstance is on the Respondent. The Respondent has failed to
prove such exemption.

14. I he Respondent has violated the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Older ~ - J
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A 15-102 based on Respondent's assistance t»- ^miie^e v .-.:
PEO doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of I Itah.
b . i , , , , . , , , , , , ,,u\n)g detei mined that neither Employei s Mi ltual, LLC nor Privilege
Care PEO toi purposes of the present proceeding are ERISA sanctioned programs and
that as such the Respondent's actions in i narketing such were in violation as alleged by
the Complainant the question now becomes what is the appropriate penalty?
16. a. No evidence of previous sii i lilat violations oi otl ler major problems with the
Respondent's license were presented.
b i \s per Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 at least twenty-two (22) sepai ate persons
have advanced letters of support for the Respondent. Some apparently being former or
present co-workers or agents as well as consumers for whom the Respondent has served
as an agent.
ii Such letters speak glowingly of the Responurm ^ Ki ^ i^ n \. A.»u u.v v ...
viewing tf le Respondent's testimony does not doi ibt that be is basically a sincere and
good person,
17. a. 1 hat said the evidence is also abundantly clear that the Respondent was not a
good agent and has done a great disservice to the partici liar consi Liners to whom, he
marketed in the present instance.
b. l. it it. i it: ai 1 hat the Respondent was for want t r ; 1>- Her phrase "out of his
element".
ii. The Respondent haa nr nk-a \-\hat IRIS A u a- ai^ L vt u at the hearing the
Court questions if the Respondent even .J-JH luis any real idea of w hat an ERISA program
is.

c. H-'.-aJMi dii) |;ivuini(... ihe say so oi non L .:, \\\, ,u; m nkeimg '"tat, -• in as
presented by Five Star Marketing as to Employers Mutual, LL in the first place i.-.ises
serious questions in the Court's mind
Counsel for Respondent makes much ado that Privilege l a i c i-'Lw ^ j-.v.pajij .i.iJ u, i.ui,, a,^ -.. t
insurance. Ms. Wilbert's and Mr. Miller's testimony clearly indicated that they believed it was insurance
From the Court's review of Complainant Exhibit No. 3, which is the only real printed literature about the
companies advanced, consisting of sixteen (16) pages while there is present the "contractual agreement"
spoken of by Mr. Garnett and some other references to "multiemployer trusts" (ERISA language, etc.) the
bulk of the apparent Privilege Care PEO/Privilege Care Marketing Group , Inc. information presents itself
as health insurance marketing materials. The average person looking at such (especially the "selfemployed' targets) like Ms. Wilbert and Mr. Miller as they testified would as does the Court view such as
"health care insurance". Calling a horse a cow does not make it moo. Just simply calling health care
insurance an ERISA sanctioned program does not make it so. Neigh (sic) this is/was insurance which the
marketers hoped to ride on the backs of consumers to the finish line of the consumers pocketbook. While
the Respondent may not have been the trainer or jockey he was one of the stable exercise boys assisting in
preparing for the race

d. i. To then even after the issuance of the December 6 , 2001 Cease and Desist
Order wherein it clearly stated that Respondent "shall immediately Cease and Desist any
assistance to airy person doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah"
to market Privilege Care PEO or any other product on the mere further non-letterheaded
printed material say so or verbal thoughts of one (James M. Doyle) who states "we're not
named in the C & D so go ahead" or words to such effect borders on incredulity.
ii. It is especially disturbing that red flags didn't go up to the Respondent
when such statement was made by a James M. Doyle, President, Privilege Care
Marketing Group, Inc., P. O. Box 177, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057, when one of the
named Respondents in the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist was a Jim Doyle, 141
Ganttown Road, Suite E, Turnersville, New Jersey 08012. Such in itself let alone the
other issues rampant in the program(s) raised the necessity of extensive "due diligence"
on the Respondent's part.
e. The Respondent argues he did due diligence. In so many words the Respondent's
due diligence was taking on face value what the marketers told him or faxed him. This
sounds much like the Emperor's New Clothes. For like the "two swindlers [who] came to
this city; they made people believe that they were weavers and declared they could
manufacture the finest cloth to be imagined(.)" and that "[t]heir colours and patterns, they
said, were not only exceptionally beautiful, but the clothes made of their material
possessed the wonderful quality of being invisible to any man who was unfit for his
office or unpardonably stupid(.)", so too were "weavers' Don R. Smith and Jim Doyle
strangers to this (Salt Lake) city. The Respondent did little if anything to look behind the
promotional materials and search out what ERISA is/was or inquire of the alleged
underwriter other than one or two token phone calls. As testified to by Mr. Taylor,
Department Market Conduct Examiner, "if its sounds too good to be true,
"
18. a. That the Respondent would on January 25th, 2002 after having been told less
than twenty-four (24) hours prior on January 24th, 2002 by Department representatives
that Privilege Care PEO was at the least questionable and as testified to by both Mr.
Hansen and Mr. Taylor told that it was an unauthorized insurer go ahead and market such
to Mr. Miller surpasses incredulity and approaches ludicrous behavior.
b. And beyond the January 25th, 2002 Miller circumstance further on January 29th,
2002 the Respondent approached Mr. Milne, a fellow agent, as to marketing Privilege
Care.
c. While arguendo misguided and confused prior to the January 24th, 2002 face to
face warning from Department representatives the Respondent's actions on January 25th
and 29th, 2002 raise in the Court's mind questions of not only the Respondent's arguable
competence as an agent, but whether Respondent is a rationale functioning adult as well.
4

Vie Emperor's New Suit, Hans Christian Andersen (1837).

19. The Respondent presents that no one was 1 ia.1 i i :ied 1 1 iat 1 le has made whole 1:1 ic
instant consumers. Such speaks well of the Respondent yet. the Court, gets the impression
such was done not so much out of empathy for the consul ner and what the Respondent
did to place the consumer lim harms way", but apprehension of what might befall the
Respondent.
20. *- ^;. M n uu v oin
.. ,; IMP «t'wt nuviL,. me Kespondenfs actions ii i
assisting in d( nig ol an una-.- :• :.. ed insuiance business as the "secondgreatest sin" tl iat
an agent could commit. Second m- w a , ageni tahng pn mi runs and not delivering
them ,«: TW;TI-T oi nf embezzlement ol insurance proceeds ' ^nn^-e] is correct in his
analysis.
21. a II le Respondent's testimony at hearing ren linds oi le of the Emperor's actions
when he heard the little cl likl'exclain i amongst others "But he has nothing on at all". For
as the fable states: "Tliat made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him
that they were right; but he thought to himself 'Now I must bear up to the end'. And the
chamberlains walked with still greater d vnitv tis they carried the train which did not
exist.
b. Tl le Coi irt accordingly feels that anything short of revocati^
Respondent's license at this time would not serve the interest of the g u . ^ ; i public nor
protect the potential consumers the Respondent might come in contact with would he be
permitted to retain his agent license for like the Emperor 1le is "'unfit for his office",

liAMMi i »^ i ill-. u»u> i, A N . ; FOREGOING BINDINGS OF FAC I ai id
d-rn^ini* .-:: 11\ <is the Piesiding Officer enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS Ol

I.AVV

1. I he [Commissioner sj L t t.\t .sud PCMM Order uih.ci date of D e c e r n e d (- -H)1
was promulgated in accordance wuh s^, M«MI M A 2-201. n ,md was an
^^rderis.isj
necessary to secure compliance with ih: rule' rah ^1 2. a. The Respondent assisted at least two (2) persons and oi entities doing an
unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah, namely Employers Mutual, LLC
and Privilege Care PEO,
b. T h e Respondent violated Hie l
. jOOi \..case ana utwiti Otuzt and
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 basea wh Respondent's assistance M a rvrscm(s)
doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah.

The Emperor's New Suit, Hans Chiistiau Andciescn "I "!"' t "'!".

3. The imposition of a $2,500.00 administrative forfeiture in accordance with Section
31A-2-308(l)(b)(i) is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for a
violation as herein proven by the Complainant Department.

4. The "forfeiting) to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the
violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or penalty imposed' in accordance with
Section 31A-2-308(l)(a) is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for
a violation as herein proved by the Complainant Department.

5. The revocation of an agent's license in accordance with Sections 31 A-2-308(10) and
31A-23-216 is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for a violation
as herein proven by the Complainant Department.

AND BASED ON THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
the Presiding Officer enters the following:
i

ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

i

1. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 in accordance with Section 31A-2308(1 )(b)(i)is hereby assessed an administrative forfeiture of $2,500.00.
A

2. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 in accordance with Section 31A-2308(1 )(a) "shall forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the
violation" once such profit, if any, is determined after examination of the Respondent's
financial records by Department representatives.

^

3. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 in accordance with Sections 31A-2308(10) and 31A-23-216 the Respondent's insurance agent license is hereby revoked
immediately upon entry of this order.

g
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MERWIN U. STEWART,
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
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•*s

IKE.KLEINFIELD
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE and
PRESIDING OFFICER
Utah Insurance Department
State Office Building, Room 3110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 537-9246
Facsimile: (801) 538-3829
Email: MKleinfield@utah.gov

;<:fy£ ^ :}: # ^: :j: ^c

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REVIEW
Administrative Agency Review of this Order may be obtained by f iling a Petitioi i f or
Review with the Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department within thirty (30) days
of the date of ci itry of said Order consistent with Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-12 and
Administrative Rule R590-160-8.
red a failure to exl laust

I .i.u.i * ;• vvk agenc)
administrative remedies.
(R590-160-8 and Section 63-465-14)
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As an "Formal Hearing" after agency re\ icw judicial review of this Order may be
Stoned In Mbug a petit:- i) ror si ich w r;s , onsiMent w ith Utah Code Ann. Section 63
s
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2?& day of April, 2002 a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing ORDER ON HEARING (Formal Hearing) was sent certified mail,
return receipt requested, and first class mail, both postage prepaid to the following:
Gregory J. Sanders
Kipp & Christian, P. C.
Attorney for Respondent
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and a true and correct copy hand-delivered to the following:
M. GaleLemmon
Enforcement Counsel
Attorney for Complainant
Utah Insurance Department
State Office Building, Room 3110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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I__>;L.V

BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMPLAINANT:
UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

ORDER ON REVIEW

RESPONDENT:

Docket No. 2002-007-HL

GERALD G. IDE
License No. 51030

Gerald G. Ide (also referred to as "Respondent") filed a request for Agency Review
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (U.C.A.) Section 63-46b-12 and Utah Administrative Code (U.A.C.)
Rule, R590-160-8. Respondent did not request oral argument.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case began as an emergency proceeding to suspend the Respondent's license. The
Utah Insurance Department (also referred to as "Complainant") issued an Emergency Proceeding
Suspension of License on February 6, 2002. The Order suspended the Respondent's producer's
license as of February 6, 2002 for a period of 12 months from the date of the order; ordered the
Respondent to cease doing any insurance business in the State of Utah; and ordered the
Complainant to commence a formal adjudicative proceeding against the Respondent for the
revocation of Respondent's license pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A Section 63-46b-l, et seq.
The Complainant issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding and Pre-Hearing
Conference on February 6, 2002. A pre-hearing conference was set for March 13, 2002. The
notice included a copy of the Complaint alleging that the Respondent had engaged in conduct
that violated an Order of the Commissioner and provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. The
Complaint demanded that a hearing be set in the matter; that Respondent's license be revoked;
and such other relief as the presiding officer deems just.
On March 6, 2002, the Complainant received Respondent's answer to the Complaint
issued February 6, 2002. In this answer, Respondent requested that his license be reinstated and
the complaint dismissed. On March 7, 2002, the Complainant made a Motion for Summary
Judgment to be heard at the Pre-Hearing Conference scheduledfor March 13, 2002. The PreHearing Conference was continued to March 20, 2002.

On March 19, 2002, Respondent filed a Memorandum Opposing Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Motion to Amend Answer. On March 20, 2002, following the pre-hearing
conference, a Pre-Hearing Conference Order was issued granting the Complainant's motion to
withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment; granting the Respondent's Motion to Amend
Answer; setting April 24, 2002 as the date for a formal administrative hearing; setting forth the
rules for discovery; setting a cut-off date for motions; setting dates for statements of facts and
statements of issue(s); setting a date for the exchanging of witness lists and exhibit lists; and
setting a date for filing of pre-hearing memorandum.
The formal hearing was conducted on April 24, 2002. Exhibits, witness testimony, and
testimony from the Respondent and the Complainant were presented during the hearing. On
April 30,2002, the presiding officer issued his Order on Hearing. That order assessed an
administrative forfeiture of $2,500.00, assessed a forfeiture of twice the amount of profit gained
from the violation, and immediately revoked the Respondents producer's license. The order
paperwork also included instructions for seeking administrative agency review and judicial
review.
Respondent filed a Petition for Review on May 24, 2002. The Petition requested review
on the following grounds: (1) the discipline imposed by the Order is disproportionate to the
offense alleged; and (2) the decision process explained in the Order shifts the burden of proof
from the Complainant to the Respondent and thereby inappropriately concludes as a matter of
fact and as a matter of law that Respondent's license should be revoked. Also on May 24, 2002,
Respondent requested that the tapes from the hearing be provided for the purpose of having a
transcript of the hearing prepared. On June 11, 2002, Complainant filed Complainant's
Response to Respondent's Petition for Review. Complainant received a copy of the transcript of
the proceedings on August 2, 2002. On August 13, 2002, Respondent filed a Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Review. On August 26, Complainant filed Complainant's Response to
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review. On September 15, Respondent
filed a Reply Memorandum of Respondent in Support of Petition for Review. On September 26,
2002, the insurance commissioner designated the undersigned, as provided in U.C.A. Section 6346b-12(2) and U.A.C. Rule R590-160-8C, to handle Respondent's request for agency review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards for agency review correspond to the standards for judicial review of formal
adjudicative proceedings, as set forth in U.C.A. Subsection 63-46b-16(4). The applicable
standards in this review are
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; [and]
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Should the order issued by the presiding officer be set aside because he made incorrect
findings of fact and conclusions of law? Specifically, the respondent alleges in his Petition for
Review that the presiding officer's order be set-aside on any of the following grounds:
1. The discipline imposed is disproportionate to the offense alleged.
2. Standard of proof language used by presiding officer is unknown as the standard is not in
rule cited.
3. Burden is on Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized insurance, not on
Respondent to prove that product sold was exempted from Complainant regulation.
4. Complainant's declarations of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.
a. Complainant's declaration that product sold was unauthorized insurance is not
supported by substantial evidence;
b. Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that product
sold was unauthorized insurance not supported by substantial evidence; and
c. Complainant's declaration that product sold was insurance not supported by
substantial evidence.
DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND ISSUES
Issue 1: The discipline imposed is disproportionate to the offense alleged.
The selling of unauthorized insurance is a very serious allegation because the
purchaser has no recourse to the normal consumer protections available to the purchaser of an
authorized product or a product exempt from regulation. Respondent was named in a Cease and
Desist Order issued December 6, 2001, against an unauthorized insurer and was specifically
enjoined to immediately cease and desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized
insurance business in the State of Utah. Any assistance was defined as soliciting, marketing, or
proposing to make an insurance contract, taking, receiving or forwarding an application for
insurance, collecting or receiving, in full or in part, any insurance premium, issuing or delivering
an insurance policy or other evidence of an insurance contract, or publishing or disseminating
any advertisement or information for insurance for any unauthorized insurer. In January and
February of 2002, in violation of the December 6, 2001 cease and desist order, the Respondent
assisted another unauthorized insurer to do business in the State of Utah by soliciting, marketing,
taking and forwarding applications for insurance, and receiving insurance premium.
Issue 2: Standard of proof language used by presiding officer is unknown as the standard
is not in rule cited.
The presiding officer incorrectly cited the 1999 version of the rule. The paragraph cited
is identical to the appropriate paragraph in the 2000 version of the rule.
R590-160-5. Rules Applicable to All Proceedings - effective February 3, 1994; notice
of continuation January 1, 1999
J. Standard of Proof. All issues of fact in administrative proceedings before the
commissioner shall be decided upon the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard.

R590-160-5. Rules Applicable to All Proceedings - effective November 14, 2000
(10) Standard of Proof. All issues of fact in administrative proceedings before the
commissioner shall be decided upon the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard.

Issue 3: Burden is on Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized
insurance, not on Respondent to prove that product sold was exempted from Complainant
regulation.
Producers marketing insurance products in this state are expected to understand the laws
and rules regulating the business of insurance in Utah. U.C.A. Section 31A-4-106 states a
prohibition to arranging health insurance not authorized under Chapters 5,7, 8, 9, or 14 and
provides a methodology to obtain a preemption from regulation under Section 514 of the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or other federal law. U.C.A.
Section 31 A-15-102 prohibits persons from assisting in the illegal placement of insurance with
an unauthorized insurer. U.C.A. Section 31A-23-405 prohibits assisting any person purporting
to be exempt from state insurance regulation under Section 514 of ERISA unless that person has
rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 31A-1-105.
The Complainant stated in its original Complaint that the health insurance offered by
Respondent was unauthorized insurance. The Complainant, in its Emergency Proceeding
Suspension of License, identified Privilege Care as the unauthorized insurer that the Respondent
had assisted. The Complainant also stated in testimony during Respondent's hearing that
Privilege Care was conducting business as an unauthorized insurer. Respondent offered no
evidence, other than testimony that the health insurance marketed by Respondent was a benefit
provided through membership in a professional employer organization (PEO), to refute the
Complainant's finding that the health insurance offered through the PEO was unauthorized
insurance. The fact that the health insurance was being marketed through a PEO does not
exempt the health insurance from having to comply with state insurance laws and regulations or
qualify for a Section 514 of ERISA exemption. All health insurance offered in this state, no
matter in what context it is marketed, must comply with state insurance laws and regulations or
qualify for a Section 514 of ERISA exemption.
Issue 4a: Complainant's declaration that product sold was unauthorized insurance is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Respondent correctly stated that the Complainant does not have jurisdiction over
professional employer organizations. Privilege Care PEO as a PEO is not under the jurisdiction
of the Complainant. However, the health insurance offered by Privilege Care PEO is subject to
the Complainant's jurisdiction unless Privilege Care PEO perfects a preemption of jurisdiction
under Section 514 of ERISA. Respondent did not present evidence Privilege Care PEO had a
preemption of jurisdiction. Complainant presented substantial evidence that Privilege Care PEO
was offering health insurance and the health insurance offered was not underwritten by an
admitted health insurer.

Issue 4b: Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that
product sold was unauthorized insurance not supported by substantial evidence.
Respondent is an experienced life and health insurance producer as evidenced by his
having been licensed for twenty-seven years. He admits to not knowing much about ERISA or
unauthorized insurance. On December 6, 2001, Respondent was named in a Cease and Desist
order because of his involvement with assisting an unauthorized insurer. The cease and desist
order should have indicated to the Respondent that he did not know what constituted assisting an
unauthorized insurer and heightened his need to learn what constituted unauthorized insurance to
protect himself and his clients. Producers have an obligation to understand what constitutes
assisting an unauthorized insurer and to understand what constitutes unauthorized insurance.
Producers, therefore, must do any necessary research to determine that any insurance they
choose to present to their clients is either issued by an insurer authorized to do the business of
insurance in this state or is preempted from state insurance regulation.
Shortly after the December 6, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was effective, Respondent
was solicited by persons named with him in the December 6, 2001 Cease and Desist Order to
market health insurance to replace the health insurance issued by the unauthorized insurer named
in the Cease and Desist Order. Respondent testified that he did not understand the replacement
product he was selling and that he relied on information supplied by the same persons that had
assured him that the previous health insurance had been authorized health insurance when it fact
it was not. Respondent testified that he did not do independent research to determine if Privilege
Care PEO was offering health insurance provided by an authorized insurer or health insurance
preempted from Complaint's regulation under Section 514 of ERISA until after the Complainant
indicated to him that Privilege Care PEO was not an authorized insurer. Evidence presented in
the record clearly shows that sufficient indicators were present to alert Respondent that the health
insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was not authorized insurance. Respondent failed
to learn what constituted unauthorized insurance and to do the necessary research to ensure the
replacement health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was not being issued by an
unauthorized insurer. Ignorance of the law is not an excuse for violating the law.
Issue 4c: Complainant's declaration that product sold was insurance not supported by
substantial evidence.
Respondent's clients testified that they understood they were being offered health
insurance to replace the health insurance previously sold to them by the Respondent. Materials
from Privilege Care PEO introduced into evidence and used by the Respondent in his
presentations to his clients clearly indicate that the product includes health insurance. The
completed forms introduced into evidence as completed by the Respondent at the time of
presentation to his clients were health insurance forms.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The order by the presiding officer should not be set aside because he made incorrect
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
a. The discipline imposed is not disproportionate to the offense alleged.
(1) Respondent, by assisting an unauthorized insurer, placed his clients at substantial
financial risk because health insurance issued by unauthorized insurers is not protected by the
consumer protections provided for health insurance issued by an authorized insurer.
(2) Placing clients at substantial financial risk is a very serious violation of a producer's
obligations to his clients.
(3) Respondent was named in a Cease and Desist Order issued December 6, 2001, against
an unauthorized insurer and was specifically enjoined to immediately cease and desist any
assistance to any person doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah.
(4) Respondent assisted another unauthorized insurer to do business in the State of Utah
by soliciting, marketing, taking and forwarding applications for insurance, and receiving
insurance premium during January and February of 2002.
(5) Respondent violated the terms of the commissioner's December 2001 Cease and
Desist Order by assisting an unauthorized insurer during January and February 2002.
(6) Violation of a commissioner's order is a very serious breach of a producer's
responsibilities.
(8) Respondent is an experienced insurance producer as evidenced by his having been
licensed for twenty-seven years.
(7) The penalty imposed by the presiding officer was not disproportionate based on the
Respondent's experience as an insurance producer, the very serious violation of his obligations
to his clients, and the very serious breach of his responsibilities as a producer.
b. Standard of proof language cited by the presiding officer does not set an unknown
standard.
(1) The presiding officer incorrectly cited the 1999 version of the rule.
(2) The standard of proof language in the 2000 version of the rule is identical to the
standard of proof language in the 1999 version of the rule.
(3) The incorrect rule citation by the presiding officer did not impose a different standard
of proof so the Respondent's statement that the standard of proof is unknown and thereby sets an
unknown standard is incorrect.
c. The order by the presiding officer should not be set aside because burden is on
Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized insurance, not on Respondent to prove
that product sold was exempted from Complainant regulation.
(1) The Complainant stated in its original complaint that the product offered by
Respondent was unauthorized insurance.
(2) The Complainant, in its Emergency Proceeding Suspension of License, specifically
identified Privilege Care as the unauthorized insurer that the Respondent had assisted.
(3) A defense against the Complainant's allegation of assisting an unauthorized insurer is
to prove incorrect the Complainant's declaration that the insurer being assisted by the
Respondent is an unauthorized insurer.
(4) The burden of proof was rightly placed on the Respondent.

d. Complainant's declarations of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
(1) Complainant's declaration that the health insurance marketed by the Respondent was
unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial evidence.
(i) Respondent did not present evidence that Privilege Care PEO had a preemption of
jurisdiction under Section 514 of ERISA or that the health insurance offered through Privilege
Care PEO was issued by an authorized insurer.
(ii) Complainant presented substantial evidence that Privilege Care PEO was offering
health insurance and the health insurance offered was not issued by an authorized health insurer.
(iii) The Complainant's declaration that the health insurance marketed by the Respondent
was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial evidence.
(2) Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that health
insurance marketed by the Respondent was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial
evidence.
(i) Respondent is an experienced health and life insurance producer as evidenced by his
having been licensed for twenty-seven years.
(ii) As an experienced health and life producer, Respondent has an obligation to
understand what constitutes assisting an unauthorized insurer and what constitutes unauthorized
insurance.
(iii) Evidence presented in the record clearly shows that sufficient indicators were present
to alert Respondent that the health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was
unauthorized insurance.
(iv) Respondent failed to learn what constitutes assisting an unauthorized insurer and to
do the necessary research to ensure the health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was
authorized insurance.
(v) Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that health
insurance marketed by the Respondent was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial
evidence.
(3) Complainant's declaration that health insurance marketed by the Respondent was
insurance is supported by substantial evidence.
(i) Respondent's clients testified that they understood they were being offered health
insurance to replace the health insurance previously sold to them by the Respondent.
(ii) Materials from Privilege Care PEO introduced into evidence and used by the
Respondent in his presentations to his clients clearly indicate that the product includes health
insurance.
(iii) The completed forms introduced into evidence as completed by the Respondent at
the time of presentation to his clients were health insurance forms.
(iv) Complainant's declaration that health insurance marketed by the Respondent was
insurance is supported by substantial evidence.

ORDER ON REVIEW
Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and a review of the record in
the matter, Respondent's request to set aside the presiding officer's Order on Hearing is hereby
denied.
This order constitutes a final order of the Commissioner in the proceeding and any party
aggrieved by the order may seek judicial review by filing a petition for judicial review with
appropriate appellate court within thirty days after the date the order is issued.
Dated this^kT" day of October 2002.
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J. Braun, Jr.
distant Insurance Commissioner
Designee of the Commissioner
I hereby adopt the analysis, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the order of the
designee as my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Review in this matter.

Merwin U. Stewart
anc< Commissioner
Insurance

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1 do hereby certify that on this date I mailed, by regular mail, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the attached:

ORDER ON REVIEW

To the following:

Gregory J. Sander. Esg.
Kipp & Christian, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, 4 ,h Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

DATED this S\

day of Q o ^ - H O e . y —

Gerald G. Ide
7303 S. 1710 E.
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

2002.
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Julie Zarkos Insurance Technician
Utah Department of Insurance
State Office Building, Room 3110
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6901
Telephone (801) 538-3800

ADDENDUM "C"
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(55) (Supp. 2002)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(63) (Supp. 2002)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(68) (Supp. 2002)
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(125) (Supp. 2002)

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301 (Supp. 2002)
(55) (a) "Health care insurance" or "health insurance" means insurance providing:
(i) health care benefits; or
(ii) payment of incurred health care expenses,
(b) "Health care insurance" or "health insurance" does not include accident and
health insurance providing benefits for:
(i) replacement of income;
(ii) short-term accident;
(iii) fixed indemnity;
(iv) credit accident and health;
(v) supplements to liability;
(vi) workers' compensation;
(vii) automobile medical payment;
(viii) no-fault automobile;
(ix) equivalent self-insurance; or
(x) any type of accident and health insurance coverage that is a part of or
attached to another type of policy.
(63) (a) "Insurance" means:
(i) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or
more persons to one or more other persons; or
(ii) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the distribution of a risk or risks among
a group of persons that includes the person seeking to distribute that person's risk.
(b) "Insurance" includes:
(i) risk distributing arrangements providing for compensation or replacement for
damages or loss through the provision of services or benefits in kind;
(ii) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered into by the guarantor or surety as
a business and not as merely incidental to a business transaction; and
(iii) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the person who makes the
arrangements, but with a class of persons who have agreed to share it.
(68) "Insurance business" or "business of insurance" includes:
(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (55), by
organizations that are or should be licensed under this title;
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event of contingencies not within the
control of the employees, in which the employees are entitled to the benefits as a
right, which benefits may be provided either:
(i) by single employers or by multiple employer groups; or
(ii) through trusts, associations, or other entities;
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in return for gifts, except those
provided by persons specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and (3);

(d) providing the characteristic services of motor clubs as outlined in Subsection
(82);
(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsection (63);
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make as insurer,
guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insurance;
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insurance, including
solicitation, negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of a contract of title
insurance, insuring, and transacting matters subsequent to the execution of the
contract and arising out of it, including reinsurance; and
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent to
Subsections (68)(a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this
title.
(125) (a) "Unauthorized insurer," "unadmitted insurer," or "nonadmitted insurer"
means an insurer:
(i) not holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance business in
this state; or
(ii) transacting business not authorized by a valid certificate.
(b) "Admitted insurer" or "authorized insurer" means an insurer:
(i) holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance business in this
state; and
(ii) transacting business as authorized by a valid certificate.

ADDENDUM "D"
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-4-106 (2001)
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-4-106 (2001)
31A-4-106. Provision of health care.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same definition as in
Section 78-14-3.
(2) Except under Subsection (3) or (4), a person may not directly or indirectly
provide health care, or arrange for, manage, or administer the provision or
arrangement of, collect advance payments for, or compensate providers of health
care unless authorized to do so or employed by someone authorized to do so under
Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to:
(a) a natural person or professional corporation that alone or with others
professionally associated with the natural person or professional corporation, and
without receiving consideration for services in advance of the need for a particular
service, provides the service personally with the aid of nonprofessional assistants;
(b) a health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which:
(i) is licensed or exempt from licensing under Title 26, Chapter 21; and
(ii) does not engage in health care insurance as defined under Section 31 A-1-301;
(c) a person who files with the commissioner under Section 31 A-1 -105 a
certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or other evidence
satisfactory to the commissioner, showing that the laws of Utah are preempted under
Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or other
federal law;
(d) a person licensed under Chapter 23 who:
(i) has arranged for the insurance of all services under:
(A) Subsection (2) by an insurer authorized to do business in Utah;
(B) Section 31 A-15-103; or
(C) works for an uninsured employer that complies with Chapter 13; or
(e) an employer that self-funds its obligations to provide health care services or
indemnity for its employees if the employer complies with Chapter 13.
(4) A person may not provide administrative or management services for any
other person subject to Subsection (2) and not exempt under Subsection (3) unless
the person is an authorized insurer under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14, or complies with
Chapter 25.
(5) It is unlawful for any insurer or person providing, administering, or managing
health care insurance under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14 to enter into a contract that
limits a health care provider's ability to advise the health care provider's patients or
clients fully about treatment options or other issues that affect the health care of the
health care provider's patients or clients.

ADDENDUM "E"
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-102 (2001)

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-102 (2001)
31A-15-102. Assisting unauthorized insurers.
(1) No person may do any act enumerated under Subsection (2) who knows
or should know that the act may assist in the illegal placement of insurance with an
unauthorized insurer or the subsequent servicing of an insurance policy illegally
placed with an unauthorized insurer.
(2) An act performed by mail is performed both at the place of mailing and
at the place of delivery. Any of the following acts, whether performed by mail or
otherwise, fall within the prohibition of Subsection (1):
(a) soliciting, making, or proposing to make an insurance contract;
(b) taking, receiving, or forwarding an application for insurance;
(c) collecting or receiving, in full or in part, an insurance premium;
(d) issuing or delivering an insurance policy or other evidence of an
insurance contract except as a messenger not employed by the insurer, an insurance
agent, or a broker;
(e) doing any of the following in connection with the solicitation, negotiation,
procuring, or effectuation of insurance coverage for another: inspecting risks, setting
rates, advertising, disseminating information, or advising on risk management;
(f) publishing or disseminating any advertisement encouraging the placement
or servicing of insurance that would violate Subsection (1); however this provision
does not apply to publication or dissemination to an audience primarily outside Utah
that also reaches persons in Utah unless the extension to persons inside Utah can be
conveniently avoided without substantial expense other than loss of revenue; nor
does it apply to regional or national network programs on radio or television unless
they originate in Utah;
(g) investigating, settling, adjusting, or litigating claims; or
(h) representing or assisting any person to do an unauthorized insurance
business or to procure insurance from an unauthorized insurer.
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit:
(a) an attorney acting for a client;
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an insured acting in the capacity of an
insurance buyer or manager; or
(c) insurance activities described under Section 31A-15-103.
(4) Any act performed in Utah which is prohibited under this section
constitutes appointment of the commissioner or the lieutenant governor as agent for
service of process under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310.

ADDENDUM "F"
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-405 (2001)

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-405 (2001)
31A-23-405. Services performed for unauthorized insurers.
(1) A person licensed under Chapter 23 may not perform any act that assists
any person not authorized as an insurer to act as an insurer.
(2) It is a violation of this section to assist any person purporting to be
exempt from state insurance regulation under Section 514 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, unless that person has rebutted the
presumption of jurisdiction under Section 31A-1-105.
(3) It is not a violation of this section:
(a) to assist persons engaged in self insurance as defined under Section 31A1-301; or
(b) for a surplus lines broker to engage in the placement of insurance under
Section 31 A-15-103.

